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Local telecommunications competition was an important goal of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act. We evaluate the consumer welfare effects of entry into residential local telephone service in
New York State using household-level data from September 1999 to March 2003. We address the
prevalence of nonlinear tariffs by developing a discrete/continuous demand model that allows
for service bundling and unobservable provider quality. We find that the average subscriber to
the entrants’ services gains a monthly equivalent of $2.33, or 6.2% of her bill, in welfare from
competition. These gains accrue primarily from firm differentiation and new plan introductions
rather than from price effects.
1. Introduction
 Many countries, including Australia, Canada, the European Union’s (EU) member countries,
Japan, South Korea, and the United States, require incumbent telephone companies to allow
entrants to lease individual elements of their network infrastructure at regulated rates, a practice
commonly referred to as “unbundling.” Regulators have imposed such requirements as a means
to create competitive telecommunications markets by facilitating entry and thereby benefit
consumers through adoption of new services. In this article, we study the consumer welfare
implications of unbundling policies in the United States, using a household-level data set from
New York State. Possible welfare effects, over the length of the time period of our study, derive
from price reductions, development of new service offerings, and quality differences between the
incumbent’s and entrants’ services.
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In the United States, the markets for local residential and business telephone service were
opened to competition following the 1996 Telecommunications Act (the 1996 Act). The 1996
Act allows three forms of entry: replication of the incumbent’s infrastructure, lease of the
incumbent’s existing infrastructure (unbundling), or resale of the incumbent’s services. By the
late 1990s, competitive local exchange carriers had begun service in most U.S. states, primarily
through leasing unbundled infrastructure or reselling service. As of December 31, 2003, entrants
leased 60.6% of their residential and business lines and another 16.0% involved the resale of an
incumbent’s services (Federal Communications Commission, 2004).
We evaluate the consumer welfare effects of entry in New York State by quantifying the
effects based on actual consumer choices. Although there are a few other estimates of the expected
savings by U.S. consumers because of entry into local phone service (see Telecommunications
Research & Action Center, 2000, 2001), these rely on hypothetical consumer migrations and
ignore geographic differences in providers’ service offerings. Instead, the household-level data
that we utilize allow us to model geographic variations in service offerings as well as individual
choice behavior using detailed demographics, thereby permitting a distinction between welfare
effects generated by lower prices, increased product variety, and firm-level differentiation.
Providers sell residential local phone service under a menu of two- or three-part tariffs with
monthly fees and per-unit prices, allowing consumers to choose their plan and their usage. Such
mixed discrete/continuous choices also occur in other markets such as energy, information, and
Internet access. Hanemann (1984) provides a methodology for estimating econometric models that
link the discrete and continuous choices in the same utility maximization problem. We expand
his framework along several dimensions. Our utility specification allows for flat-rate plans at
zero marginal prices, bundling of multiple services under one plan, unobserved vertical quality
differences across firms, and horizontal firm differentiation. We employ a maximum likelihood
estimation technique that combines the information from the discrete and continuous choices
by consumers. Our analysis focuses only on the demand effects of entry because regulation of
incumbent prices for both the shared infrastructure and the final services effectively limits the
role of supply-side responses.
We estimate our model using data from a random sample of New York households over a
three and a half year period beginning in late 1999. We focus on New York because it was one of
the first states to experience entry under the 1996 Act. Significant entry occurs by the end of our
sample period, with entrants serving over 20% of the access lines. The largest entrants are AT&T
and MCI, which comprise approximately 85% of the residential lines served by entrants. They
compete with the incumbent, Verizon, whose customers are also included in the analysis.
Applying our econometric model to the household-level data, we are able to quantify the
full distribution of welfare effects of entry. We find that these effects differ dramatically across
households, underscoring the need for a household-level analysis. The addition of the entrants’
plans to the choice set leads, on average, to household gains of $0.83 per month, or 2.5% of
households’ average monthly bill. The standard deviation of welfare gains across households is
$3.42, with average gains of $2.77 and $1.13 accruing to AT&T and MCI subscribers, respectively.
Exploiting the detailed household-level data, we decompose the different sources of
consumer benefits from entry and determine who gains the most from unbundling. The entrants
introduce several new plans not offered by the incumbent. We find that considerable gains to
consumers result from these new plan varieties. The introduction by AT&T and MCI of a flat-rate
plan previously unavailable in New York City entails a welfare increase of $0.68 per month on
average, whereas AT&T’s introduction of a combined local and regional calling plan results in a
welfare increase of $0.21 per month on average across all households.
Although the entrants employ the same technological infrastructure as the incumbent, their
services are vertically and horizontally differentiated due to nontechnological factors, such as
customer support and marketing. Observed and unobserved firm effects play an important role
in households’ choices. Prior experience with an entrant’s long-distance services is particularly
important, suggesting that households consider a prior relationship in forming their assessment of
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the entrant’s local service quality. We find that AT&T households enjoy monthly benefits of $1.84
per month from such differentiation, whereas MCI households receive monthly benefits of $0.64.
This compares to savings of $1.15 and $0.40 over what the average AT&T and MCI household,
respectively, would have paid on Verizon based on pure price effects alone. Thus, a focus
only on prices, disregarding firm differentiation, significantly understates household welfare
gains.
Relating household-level welfare benefits to household characteristics, we find that larger
households in New York City benefit more from entry, presumably due to the entrants’
introductions of new flat-rate plans there. The fact that high-usage households, which on average
are lower income, black, and larger, gain more than other households do suggests that competition
intensifies primarily for high-valuation customers. Customers of the entrants’ long-distance
services also gain more, consistent with the importance of horizontal firm differentiation.
Our results are particularly interesting because, according to the provisions of the 1996 Act,
incumbents and entrants were to compete starting with identical inputs and on an equal footing.
Our finding that entrants offer differentiated services and introduce meaningful new plan types
is thus important for quantifying the benefits of regulatory measures to increase competition
when entrants and incumbents share infrastructure. We find that these effects are more important
than the pure price effects. This is consistent with results in Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006), who
find that entrants’ initial market selection depends on differentiation strategies, in addition to
factors highlighted by Crandall and Sidak (2002) and Zolnierek, Eisner, and Burton (2001), such
as demand and cost differences across markets, economies of geographic scope, and regulatory
stringency.
In March 2004, the DC Court of Appeals reversed the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s (FCC) implementation of unbundling policies, finding that the absence of nationwide
access to the local telecommunications network at “cost plus reasonable profit” did not “impair”
entrants, as the 1996 Act required. Thereafter, incumbents were not required to follow cost-based
pricing in leasing the local network. As a result, the largest entrants stopped accepting new
customers (see Economides, 2005 for more detail). Despite the short-lived effects of unbundling
in the United States, the experience through 2004 is instructive for several reasons. First, it offers
a unique opportunity to inform decisions of whether to initiate or continue unbundling policies in
local telecommunications markets in other countries or settings. These include unbundling cable
modem Internet access, presently awaiting implementation in Canada, cable television service,
under consideration in The Netherlands, and DSL Internet access, mandated by the EU’s 2000
Unbundling Regulation. Second, the detailed U.S. data available allow an assessment of the
economic implications of unbundling policies, such as the sources and magnitudes of any welfare
gains and the types of households that are likely to benefit. Although the specifics of settings
differ, our results suggest that initiatives to promote unbundled access in other countries should
consider broader implications beyond price effects.
2. New York’s local telephone markets
 New York has two sizeable incumbents, whose geographic territories are displayed in
Figure 1. Frontier Communications of New York controls 8% of incumbent business and
residential access lines as of December 31, 2001, while Verizon controls 89%. The 1996 Act
introduces local telecommunications competition in Verizon’s region, which had not previously
opened its markets to competition.
The New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) serves two roles related to our study
in regulating the local phone market. First, it sets infrastructure lease rates that entrants pay to the
incumbent. These rates remain stable during our sample period with the exception of a decrease
of about 30% in July 2002. The lease rates vary by geographic zone within the state, averaging
approximately $20 per line served as of early 2001 and falling to approximately $15 by the middle
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FIGURE 1
INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS, NEW YORK STATE
of 2002.1 Second, the NYPSC regulates the retail rates that incumbents charge for local phone
services. We describe the retail prices faced by customers in our sample in Section 3.
The entrants’ market share of residential lines increases steadily from 6% in 1999 to 22%
in 2002. The main entrants in New York during our sample period are AT&T and MCI, both
of which expand into local service from the long-distance market. As of December 31, 2001,
AT&T and MCI hold shares of 58% and 27%, respectively, of residential lines served by entrants
in New York. AT&T’s initial entry into New York occurs in late 1999 and focuses on the state’s
metropolitan areas, as displayed in Figure 2. In 2001, AT&T enters into the remainder of Verizon’s
territory. MCI enters Verizon’s entire territory in 1999.
By 2001, each of the three carriers offers three types of phone service: local, regional, and
long-distance. Local service applies to phone calls in the household’s local calling area. The
carriers define local calling areas identically. These differ significantly in the population served,
ranging from 1,873 people in Indian Lake to 7.98 million people in New York City, with an
average of 304,597 people. Local calling areas are grouped into seven regional calling areas. The
local service provider generally handles calls within these regions and outside of the household’s
local calling area, but imposes higher prices. All remaining calls qualify as long-distance calls.
Although Verizon also began offering long-distance service in 2001, it and the entrants provided
long-distance service primarily under separate calling plans from local and regional service during
our sample period. As a result, we concentrate on estimating the benefits from competition in
local and regional service.
The carriers provide local and regional phone services through monthly calling plans, of
which three types are available to New York customers. Metered plans include a monthly fee to
obtain service and a per-call fee for usage. Flat-rate plans specify a monthly fee for unlimited
calling. Hybrid plans are three-part tariffs where a household pays a monthly fee to obtain a certain
number of calls at zero marginal price. For calls above the predefined allowance, the household
1 Based on Appendices 2 and 3 in cad.state.wv.us/Intro%20to%20Matrix%201-02.htm. The cost figures assume
1000 minutes of usage per month and incorporate discounts for leasing all network elements.
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FIGURE 2
AT&T’S ENTRY INTO LOCAL SERVICE, NEW YORK STATE, 1999
pays a positive marginal price. The FCC requires local carriers to offer additional calling plans
at reduced rates to qualifying low-income households.
Local phone service providers also offer add-on features, such as call waiting, call
forwarding, three-way calling, and speed dialing, to their customers. During the time period
of our study, the carriers do not bundle these features with local or regional service. Instead, they
offer them as optional features that households purchase along with basic service.
3. Data
 We analyze plan choice and usage behavior using data on a sample of New York households
collected by TNS Telecoms (TNS), complemented with data on the geography and structure of
local telephone markets from various sources. TNS’s Bill Harvesting data contain survey data from
residential customers. TNS gathers demographic information on the households and asks them to
submit their actual phone bill. Because willingness to respond varies by household characteristics,
TNS employs oversampling to obtain a random sample. Most households participate in the survey
only once. Our sample runs from September 1999 through March 2003 and covers a total of 7222
cross-sectional household observations.
For each household, the data set contains information on its local carrier choice and any
detailed line items recorded on its local telephone bill, including the services the household
purchased, total amount paid, and a breakdown of the bill into services, fees, and regulatory
charges. For households that subscribe to metered service or exceed their call allowance on a
hybrid plan, we observe the number of calls made during the billing period. Local usage is
generally not available for the remaining households, notably those on flat-rate plans.
The TNS data do not directly identify the calling plan chosen by the household. Instead, we
use descriptions of purchased services and associated expenditures to identify the household’s
chosen calling plan based on publicly available information. The NYPSC requires all carriers to
publicly file retail price information whenever prices change, allowing us to construct the universe
of calling plans and their prices at all times during our sample period. Because providers adjust
consumers’ bills to reflect price changes as they go into effect, we identify each household’s plan
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics—Demographic Variables
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Obs Description
CELLULAR 0.360 0.480 0 1 5496 At least one cellular phone in household
INTERNET 0.411 0.492 0 1 5524 Internet access at home
HHSIZE 2.083 1.190 1 5 5524 Number of people in hh
INCOME 3.894 3.385 0.425 12.86 5524 Monthly hh income (000)
AGE (15–34) 0.110 0.313 0 1 5524 Head of hh between 15 and 34 years old
AGE (35–54) 0.353 0.478 0 1 5524 Head of hh between 35 and 54 years old
AGE (55+) 0.536 0.499 0 1 5524 Head of hh above 54 years old
BLACK 0.058 0.234 0 1 5524 Head of hh is black
HISPANIC 0.048 0.214 0 1 5524 Head of hh is Hispanic
RACEO 0.049 0.215 0 1 5524 Head of hh is not white or black
MOVED1Y 0.055 0.228 0 1 4556 Hh moved within last year
NYCITY 0.153 0.360 0 1 5524 Hh lives in New York City
SAMLD 0.388 0.487 0 1 5524 Hh has same local and long-distance carrier
AT&T 0.885 0.319 0 1 592
MCI 0.853 0.355 0 1 218
VERIZON 0.306 0.461 0 1 3975
SAMBILL 0.801 0.400 0 1 3825 Hh billed jointly for local and long distance
AT&T 0.970 0.170 0 1 504
MCI 0.944 0.231 0 1 195
VERIZON 0.763 0.425 0 1 2541
among contemporaneous plans. Across providers, we are able to match 97.2% of households to
a calling plan.
Because AT&T and MCI did not enter into Frontier Communications’s territory, we focus
on households that reside in Verizon’s territory. We use the household’s location, available at the
zip-code level, together with detailed data on the availability of AT&T’s and MCI’s local service,
to construct the household’s choice set of local service carriers and plans at the time of its bill. We
employ the Center for Communications Management Information’s QTEL Local Calling Area
Database, which maps the first six digits of a telephone number to the set of telephone numbers that
can be called locally, to identify each household’s local calling area based on its telephone number.
To measure the size of the potential calling area for local and regional service, the “coverage area,”
we use mapping software to measure the calling area’s population based on the 2000 Census.
Of the 7222 households in the data, 696 subscribe to AT&T, 931 to Frontier Communications,
362 to MCI, and 5233 to Verizon. We exclude the Frontier customers and the remaining
547 subscribers to other, small carriers from the sample. The entrants’ representation in the
resulting sample is similar to aggregate market shares for New York. In 2001, for example, the
NYPSC reports market shares based on number of lines of 11.8% and 5.6% for AT&T and
MCI, respectively, while in the TNS sample for the same year, 12.2% of households are AT&T
customers and 5.4% are MCI customers. Due to missing information, reporting errors by TNS, or
other data issues, we are not able to use all available observations in our estimation. The sample
observations with complete demographic and usage information total 592 (85%) for AT&T, 218
(62%) for MCI, and 3981 (76%) for Verizon.2
The TNS data contain information on the household’s basic demographic profile as well as
use of other telecommunications services and technology products. We summarize the available
variables in Table 1. Household size and income are likely the strongest proxies for demand for
usage. TNS reports the household’s income as a categorical variable. To transform it into a single
2 Excluding households that switch or connect service during the month, have multiple phone lines, or subscribe to
plans unavailable to the population at large or bundle long-distance and local service results in 601 AT&T, 218 MCI, and
5021 Verizon households. The remaining decrease in observations is due to incomplete demographic data.
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continuous variable, we assign to each household an income equal to the predicted average income
level in its category, as in Miravete (2002b). Compared to the state’s aggregate distribution, the
income distribution is slightly skewed toward lower-income households. Other demand shifters
include whether the household moved in the past year and had to choose a new service provider,
whether at least one member of the household subscribes to cellular service, and whether the
household has access to the Internet at home.
Table 1 displays the households’ long-distance provider choices in relation to their local
provider choices. Across all firms, 38.8% of households use the same provider for local and
long-distance service. This fraction is significantly higher for entrants, however; 88.5% of AT&T
customers and 85.3% of MCI customers subscribe to these providers’ long-distance services. In
the data, we also observe whether households receive a single bill for local and long-distance
service. Verizon offers households an option to request that their long-distance service be billed
through the incumbent on a single bill regardless of long-distance provider. Of the households
that use Verizon’s local service, 76.3% elect this co-billing option. The entrants offer a similar
service for a charge of $1.50 per month. Of AT&T and MCI’s customers, 97.0% and 94.4%,
respectively, receive the same bill, either because they use the same firm’s long-distance service
or pay the $1.50 charge.
Some simplifications of the data are necessary to make estimation tractable. Depending on
the chosen plan, carriers bill usage in terms of either minutes or calls. They generally bill regional
calling on a per-call basis. Charges may vary by time of day, length of call, or, in the case of
regional service, distance of call. We convert all usage information to a per-call basis, using the
empirical distributions of call lengths, intra-day calling patterns, and call distances to construct
measures of numbers of calls and weighted-average per-call prices. In the remainder of the article,
we ignore within-call nonlinear pricing due to the household’s choice of timing of individual calls
or distance of calls made. The latter could bias our results if, for example, a customer’s preference
for making many short calls steers her to a provider that bills on a per-minute rather than a
per-call basis. Descriptively, however, the data do not suggest that households’ call durations or
their call distributions over the course of the day differ significantly across carriers, providing
some evidence that the role of within-call nonlinear pricing in driving households’ plan choices
is limited.
Typically, the carriers each offer one metered plan and one flat-rate plan for local calls.
There are several exceptions to this. From 1999 until September 2000, MCI offers an additional
hybrid plan for local service. Only AT&T offers flat-rate service to New York City customers
during the entire sample period, while MCI introduces this option in September 2000 and
Verizon does so only after the end of our sample period. In addition, AT&T offers a calling plan
that bundles local and regional services into a hybrid plan with a single price for both local and
regional calls in excess of the joint call allowance. On average, households have a choice of six
calling plans across providers, ranging from three plans in areas where AT&T entered only in
2001 to eight in areas where all three firms operate.
Under the NYPSC’s regulation, Verizon holds basic service prices constant from at least
September 1, 1995 until September 2000 and reduces them thereafter. Verizon thus does not
change its pricing as an entry-deterrence strategy. In parallel with the 2002 decrease in wholesale
lease rates, the NYPSC grants Verizon a retail rate increase. Verizon’s prices for local metered
and regional service differ for metro and non-metro regions, and prices for flat-rate service differ
across five geographic areas. AT&T and MCI employ a simpler pricing strategy, charging a single
price to all metered customers and differentiating pricing of the flat-rate plan only between metro
and non-metro regions.
Table 2 summarizes the plan choices and prices paid by households in the sample. A large
share of customers, 47.5%, subscribe to metered service, which reflects in part that in New York
City, this is frequently the only type of service offered. Verizon’s metered service on average
dominates its competitors’ offerings on price: the average fixed fee paid by Verizon households is
only $5.99, compared to $8.21 and $6.27 for AT&T and MCI, respectively, while Verizon’s average
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TABLE 2 Household Carrier and Plan Choices, Usage, and Prices Paid
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Obs
Local carrier choices
AT&T 0.090 0.286 0 1 7769
Frontier 0.120 0.325 0 1 7769
MCI 0.047 0.211 0 1 7769
Verizon 0.674 0.469 0 1 7769
Other 0.070 0.256 0 1 7769
Plan choices
Flat-rate plan 0.415 0.493 0 1 5524
Metered plan 0.475 0.499 0 1 5524
Other plana 0.109 0.312 0 1 5524
Usage of local service (# of calls)
Overall 89.867 105.853 1 1299 2928
Metered plans 89.164 94.855 1 857 2623
Other plan types 95.908 173.894 1 1299 305
Usage of regional service (# of calls)
% of households, usage = 0 0.655 0.475 0 1 5405
Overall 5.052 15.557 0 257 5405
Households with usage > 0 14.648 23.694 1 257 1864
Local usage prices per call
AT&T 0.107 0.015 0.090 0.120 42
MCI 0.100 0.000 0.100 0.100 48
Verizon 0.091 0.011 0.084 0.109 2506
Regional usage prices per call
AT&T 0.299 0.048 0.270 0.379 469
MCI 0.677 0.000 0.677 0.677 218
Verizon 0.351 0.061 0.270 0.429 3981
Monthly fixed fees
AT&T Metered plans 8.214 1.503 6.500 9.500 42
Other plan types 21.757 2.752 15.350 27.950 550
MCI Metered plans 6.270 0.000 6.270 6.270 48
Other plan types 18.344 2.688 14.990 21.990 170
Verizon Metered plans 5.985 2.091 1.000 8.610 2506
Other plan types 16.362 3.115 7.850 21.520 1475
a Other plans include hybrid plans and the bundled local and regional service plan.
per-call charges are below its competitors’ prices by approximately $0.01. Similarly, Verizon’s
flat-rate customers pay lower fixed fees on average than their AT&T and MCI counterparts. Due
to varying choice sets across households and additional charges beyond basic service charges,
these statistics do not imply necessarily that Verizon is the lowest-cost option for all households
in its territory. Nevertheless, they raise the question of which considerations apart from price
drive a household’s carrier choice, which we investigate in Section 4.
4. Consumer response to entry
 A usual difficulty in assessing the effect of entry is controlling for the incumbent’s response.
In our setting, we take advantage of the fact that the NYPSC regulates the incumbent’s prices for
services and infrastructure leases and its service quality.3 Because the entrants primarily lease the
incumbent’s infrastructure, the industry’s overall cost structure remains relatively unchanged over
3 The NYPSC requires Verizon to tabulate eight service quality measures on a monthly basis, including customer
trouble report rate, out of service rate, and repair and installation times. Failing to meet service quality standards results
in penalties.
C© RAND 2008.
ECONOMIDES, SEIM, AND VIARD / 707
the time period we analyze, aside from potentially increased marketing expenditures and cost of
services such as operators.
Although entry entails changes in and a reallocation of industry profit, we focus on demand-
side responses to changes in the carrier set, instead of conducting a full welfare analysis of entry.
We consider several possible effects of entry on consumer welfare, including pure price effects
(holding usage quantity and service quality constant) and horizontal and vertical differentiation
effects resulting from the increased number of provider or plan choices.
Even though bundling of local and long-distance services in a single plan is rare during our
sample, we recognize two ways in which the household’s long-distance carrier choice is relevant
to consumer welfare. First, the entrants offer discounts to households that choose them for both
services. This discount is $1.00 for AT&T during the entire sample period and $4.95 for MCI
from August 1999 to August 2000. We account for these discounts in our estimation of the
price effects. Second, households may place value on receiving a single telecommunications bill
for both services, providing an additional incentive to choose the same local and long-distance
provider.
We begin with an assessment of the pure price effects from entry by computing the cost
savings that households realize from the choice of an entrant’s service over the incumbent’s
offerings, holding household usage constant. We then turn to the role that non-price effects
play in the demand for local service, as a motivation for the econometric model discussed in
Section 5.
 Monetary effects of entry. Abstracting from usage responses and quality differences among
firms, we compute the effect of entry by simply determining how much consumers in the Verizon
region save from the presence of the entrants. We evaluate the amount of money that AT&T or
MCI local service customers would pay to Verizon in the absence of the entrants’ services. This
requires mapping the household to a specific Verizon plan based on its usage and evaluating
the amount it would pay to Verizon under that plan, relative to its actual payment to one of the
entrants.
We make several assumptions in this counterfactual. Because we do not observe how long
a household has been with a carrier, our comparisons are contemporaneous. For example, for a
household that uses AT&T in January 2001, the hypothetical choice set includes Verizon plans
available at that same time. We assume further that households choose the optimal plan, both
among the entrants’ offerings and in the counterfactual among Verizon’s offerings. We discuss the
validity of this assumption below. If a household chooses an entrant’s flat-rate service, we compare
its expenditure with that on a flat-rate plan from Verizon, if available, because we generally do
not observe usage for such households. If Verizon flat-rate service is not available, for example
in New York City, we base charges on the household’s estimated usage conditional on its usage
exceeding the break-even point between the entrants’ metered and flat-rate services.4 Of these
assumptions, only the assumption of optimal plan choice carries through to the remainder of the
article.
Table 3 presents the results of the counterfactual with savings divided by source. On average
for the same usage, AT&T customers pay $1.15 per month less than on Verizon’s optimal
contemporaneous plan. Of this, $0.89 on average is due to buying both long-distance and local
service from AT&T, representing the 89% of AT&T sample households that receive the $1.00
long-distance discount. Another $0.53 arises from savings on add-on features. As suggested by
the price patterns in Table 2, households on average lose money on charges for local and regional
service by using AT&T.
The results for MCI are similar, although households save less on average. The mean
household saves $0.40 per month on its bill relative to subscribing to Verizon’s optimal
4 A second instance where Verizon’s offerings do not match the entrants’ offerings arises for AT&T’s bundled local
and regional service. In this case, we assume that the households would choose Verizon’s flat-rate plan for local usage
and estimate regional charges based on average regional usage for the sample.
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TABLE 3 Monthly Average Savings of Entrants’ Customers (N = 592 for AT&T, N = 218 for MCI)
Savings over Percentage
Carrier Category Charge Verizon Savingsa
AT&T Local and regional usage charges $23.25 −$0.26 −1.0
Add-on features charges 3.18 0.53 2.0
Buying long-distance from AT&T 0.89 3.3
Total savings 1.15 4.3
Standard error, savings 9.26
MCI Local and regional usage charges $19.65 −$0.61 −2.9
Add-on features charges 2.00 −0.06 −0.3
Buying long-distance from MCI 1.07 5.1
Total savings 0.40 1.9
Standard error, savings 5.51
a As percentage of average total Verizon charges ($26.69 for AT&T analysis, $20.98 for MCI analysis).
contemporaneous plan. The average household loses money on combined local and regional
charges as well as on add-on features. Households benefit on average by $1.07 from discounts
for subscribing to both local and long-distance service from MCI.
The counterfactual abstracts from quantity responses in moving to the optimal plan. This
implies that for households that realize an increase in the per-call price on the optimal plan, we
underestimate the true extent of savings. For households with a decrease in the per-call price,
however, the effect on savings is unclear: they save on preexisting usage, but also expand their
usage in total in response to the lower price.
AT&T and MCI engage in additional “off-plan” promotional activities to induce households
to choose their service. Under the majority of such promotions, qualifying households receive a
discount applied to their bill for a certain number of billing periods. Based on a comparison of
data on AT&T’s and MCI’s off-plan promotions during the sample period to the households’ bills,
none of the subscribers in the sample receives such bill credits. To the extent that households
benefit from less common off-plan promotions, any consumer welfare gains we find represent a
lower bound.
 Heterogeneity in cost savings and possible explanations. The average household savings
on AT&T and MCI mask significant heterogeneity across households. Out of 592 AT&T
households in our sample, 331 households (56%) save money by choosing AT&T. Monthly
savings for these households amount to $5.39 on average and $4.44 at the median. The vast
majority is on one of AT&T’s flat-rate plans (61.8% on local flat-rate service and 30.7% on
bundled local and regional service), including 86 households in New York City where Verizon
does not offer flat-rate service. The remainder of AT&T subscribers incurs a higher bill, paying
on average $4.24 or 22% more than their expected payment to Verizon. Of these households,
81.2% also subscribe to AT&T’s local flat-rate plan, but only 3.8% use AT&T’s bundled local and
regional plan.
Out of the 218 MCI households, 63.8% save money by choosing MCI, with average monthly
savings of $3.24 and median savings of $2.25. The remaining MCI households incur on average
additional charges of $4.59 or 19% of the price they would pay on Verizon. The propensity to
incur such additional charges differs by plan type. Only 29% of households on a metered plan and
34% of households on a hybrid plan overpay by choosing MCI compared to 54% of households
on flat-rate service.
We also compare bill amounts of households that use Verizon for local service to the expected
bill they would incur on AT&T or MCI. Verizon’s service is on average $1.68 or 3.8% cheaper
than equivalent charges for the household’s realized usage on the least costly, contemporaneous
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plan offered by one of the entrants. We again find significant heterogeneity in savings across
households with 40% of households losing $3.85, on average, by not leaving Verizon.
There are a number of reasons why a household may choose a particular carrier even though
it is not the cheapest provider. Inertia or high deliberation costs of evaluating the prices of various
calling plans could lead consumers to keep a more expensive plan. Because all subscribers start
out as Verizon consumers, inertia would lead to such instances being more frequent among
households that remain with Verizon even after the introduction of the entrants’ services.
A second explanation lies in demand uncertainty. Because the household commits to a
provider and a plan before making calls, the household’s choice may be optimal based on expected
usage, but unpredictable demand for calls causes the chosen plan to not be the least expensive
ex post. Miravete (2002a) studies the effect that uncertainty over usage has on plan choice. He
finds that consumers make, on average, the correct plan choice conditional on their realized
consumption, despite their uncertain usage. Consumers frequently switch calling plans, with the
goal of minimizing cost of service in response to small differences in cost.5 Although demand
uncertainty represents a rational explanation for the choice of a more expensive plan, DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2006) suggest that consumers systematically over- or underpredict usage and
that firms adjust their pricing strategies to lock these consumers into suboptimal plans.
A last explanation is quality differentiation by firms, whereby any overpayment represents
the consumer’s willingness to pay for higher quality of service or firm reputation. Because the
entrants lease Verizon’s infrastructure for call and add-on feature provision, the quality of call
provision is similar across firms and regulated by the NYPSC to prevent service deterioration.6
Firms differentiate their services through differences in customer service quality and in the variety
of calling plans offered. In addition, consumers may have perceptions of the carriers’ quality based
on prior experience with the entrants’ long-distance services.
We provide several forms of evidence of the drivers of household carrier choices to inform
our econometric model in Section 5. We begin with simple tabulations of the frequencies and
magnitudes of household overpayments, relative to the cheapest option available during the
household’s billing period. Table 4 summarizes the overpayments normalized by the cost of the
least expensive option, distinguishing between households that could realize savings by switching
carriers and those that could do so by simply switching to a different plan offered by the same
provider. To assess the latter, we evaluate whether households on metered service would pay less
on the provider’s flat-rate plan, if available, given their monthly usage.
The share of households with potential savings from adjusting their provider choice,
approximately 40% across providers, far exceeds the share of households that could save from
switching among the chosen provider’s plans, with t-statistics for tests of differences in mean
frequencies of 5.85 for AT&T, 4.66 for MCI, and 19.35 for Verizon households. The magnitudes
of the potential savings, however, are similar. The fact that a household’s choice of calling plan
among its carrier’s offerings is frequently correct, relative to its choice of carrier, suggests that
demand uncertainty or consumer irrationality are not very significant in biasing the choice of
plan. Corroborating evidence that demand uncertainty is relatively unimportant is the number
of households choosing a more expensive flat-rate plan. Of AT&T households with potential
cost savings, 87% choose AT&T’s flat-rate plan despite the availability of Verizon’s lower-priced
flat-rate service, while among the corresponding group of MCI households, 20% choose flat-rate
service in areas where Verizon offers a lower-cost flat-rate option. Further, we interpret this
as evidence that perceived differences in provider quality influence the household’s provider
choice. This is particularly true for households that choose flat-rate service, which eliminates
5 His findings contradict Hobson and Spady (1988) and Kling and Van der Ploeg (1990), who document a consumer
bias toward choosing a flat-rate option that does not minimize their bill, but this evidence comes from data collected
shortly after the introduction of optional local metered service and may represent a transitory effect.
6 There is little evidence of competition through innovation in or variety of add-on features. During the time period
of our sample, Verizon does not introduce significant new add-on features, nor do we observe differences in the variety
of add-on feature bundles offered across providers.
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TABLE 4 Overpayments Made by Households
Not Switching
Switching Switching to AT&T Within Within Within
Category to AT&Ta to MCIa or MCIb AT&Tc Verizond MCIe
Frequency 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.12 0.17 0.10
(Standard Deviation) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.33) (0.37) (0.30)
Mean −0.22 −0.19 −0.14 −0.38 −0.23 −0.32
Standard Deviation 0.44 0.19 0.11 0.30 0.16 0.23
Median −0.14 −0.10 −0.12 −0.47 −0.22 −0.40
Minimum −6.36 −0.90 −0.71 −0.78 −0.71 −0.49
Maximum −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.06
N 592 218 3981 42 1750 32
aAs fraction of predicted total Verizon charges.
bAs fraction of predicted charges on optimal AT&T or MCI plan.
cAs fraction of predicted charges on optimal AT&T flat-rate plan.
dAs fraction of predicted charges on optimal Verizon flat-rate plan.
eAs fraction of predicted charges on optimal MCI flat-rate plan.
any effect of unexpected demand fluctuations on price paid. Table 4 also provides evidence that
consumer inertia in decision making does not play a major role. Households that choose AT&T,
for example, are more likely to overpay for their service than Verizon households, even though
their choice indicates a willingness to search for a new provider and less inertia than the Verizon
households.
We now investigate characteristics of households that do not choose the least-expensive
provider in a probit model. In addition to demographic characteristics, we control for prior
experience that the household has with AT&T or MCI by including indicator variables for
whether the household uses AT&T or MCI for its long-distance service.7 Table 5 displays the
results of this probit model, allowing the coefficients to differ across chosen carrier.
There are few characteristics that predict the household’s likelihood not to choose the least-
expensive carrier. Households that moved in the last year are statistically and economically less
likely to overpay for local service, possibly contradicting the finding above that inertia is not
significant in driving household biases. Diverging results emerge for most other demographic
characteristics. Whereas Verizon’s minority households are statistically more likely to overpay
as a result of their carrier choice, their AT&T counterparts are statistically less likely to do so.
Similarly, larger households, possibly experiencing larger demand fluctuations, are more likely to
choose MCI erroneously, while the opposite holds for Verizon. Overall, the variances explained by
the probit models are very low, with likelihood ratio indices of 0.09 for AT&T households, 0.19 for
MCI households, and 0.13 for Verizon households,8 providing little evidence of suboptimal choice
behavior by certain demographic groups or successful targeting by the providers of consumers
based on observable characteristics.
The probit regressions also control for seasonality that induces demand variation over
months. If the seasonal controls explained a large share of the variance, it would be an indication
that households choose calling plans based on expected usage over the course of the year as
opposed to adjusting their plan choice in response to seasonal variation in usage (as we assume
in our model in Section 5). The monthly dummies only account for an increase in the likelihood
ratio index from 0.06 to 0.09 for AT&T customers, from 0.13 to 0.19 for MCI customers, and
7 We thus assume that households made their long-distance provider choice of AT&T or MCI prior to choosing the
carriers as their local service providers.
8 We use McFadden’s (1974) likelihood ratio index, defined as LRI = 1 − ln[L1]
ln[L0]
, where L0 is the log-likelihood
computed with only a constant term and L1 is the log-likelihood of the full model.
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TABLE 5 Probit Estimates of Mistaken Provider Choice
Mistaken Provider Choice Y/N
AT&T Customers MCI Customers Verizon Customers
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Variable (Standard Error) Effecta (Standard Error) Effecta (Standard Error) Effecta
INTERNET 0.1003 0.0394 0.2480 0.0891 0.1124∗∗ 0.0428
(0.1236) (0.2406) (0.0513)
CELLULAR −0.0712 −0.0279 −0.0263 −0.0094 0.1406∗∗∗ 0.0536
(0.1218) (0.2203) (0.0510)
HHSIZE −0.0282 −0.0111 0.3212∗∗∗ 0.1153 −0.1067∗∗∗ −0.0405
(0.0530) (0.1009) (0.0209)
INCOME −0.0290 −0.0114 −0.0395 −0.0142 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0227
(0.0191) (0.0352) (0.0074)
AGE (15–34) −0.7495∗∗∗ −0.2601 −0.1768 −0.0614 0.0519 0.0198
(0.2321) (0.3606) (0.0775)
AGE (35–54) −0.1252 −0.0489 0.1391 0.0504 0.0618 0.0235
(0.1414) (0.2241) (0.0501)
MOVED1Y −0.8651∗∗∗ −0.2850 −1.0462∗∗∗ −0.2636 −0.2725∗∗∗ −0.0983
(0.3580) (0.6943) (0.1050)
BLACK −0.7006∗∗∗ −0.2460 0.2341 0.0874 0.8210∗∗∗ 0.3183
(0.2176) (0.3886) (0.0949)
HISPANIC −0.6582∗∗ −0.2303 −0.4803 −0.1525 0.6743∗∗∗ 0.2639
(0.3449) (0.5697) (0.1021)
RACEO 0.2013 0.0799 0.4570 0.1743 0.2190∗∗ 0.0851
(0.3455) (0.4692) (0.1027)
SAMLD −0.6738∗∗∗ −0.2630 1.2367∗∗∗ 0.3257
(0.2571) (0.4730)
(1 - SAMLD) × −0.4946 −0.1805 1.5151∗∗∗ 0.5409 −0.0470 −0.0178
SAMBILL (0.3426) (0.6197) (0.0597)
N 592 218 3981
Log-likelihood −367.7 −116.3 −2320.9
p-value 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000
Likelihood
Ratio index 0.0947 0.1854 0.1325
A household is classified as having made a mistaken provider choice if it subscribes to a provider whose pricing plans
are not the least expensive for the household’s ex post usage. Monthly dummies and a dummy for September and October
2001 are included in the estimation. Dummy variables are included to control for missing data for the MOVED1Y,
SAMLD, and SAMBILL variables.
aFor discrete variables, marginal effects refer to a discrete change from 0 to 1.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
from 0.11 to 0.13 for Verizon customers. It appears that anticipated seasonal demand fluctuation
is, therefore, not very important in driving provider choices.
To test for the importance of consumer learning, in an alternative unreported model we
include time since the entrants’ inception of service and time since a price change, both measured
in days, as explanatory variables. The results indicate that for every 100 days since AT&T’s entry,
a household’s likelihood of erroneously choosing AT&T decreases by 2.0 percentage points,
providing statistically significant evidence of some extent of household learning. The overall
explanatory power of the model does not improve significantly, however, resulting in a likelihood
ratio index of 0.11. For MCI, in contrast, the probability of mistakes in the provider choice
increases by 3.8 percentage points for every 100 days since MCI’s entry. Across providers, thus,
we do not find consistent, practical significance of learning.
As a last piece of descriptive evidence of determinants of carrier choice, we estimate a
multinomial logit model of provider choice, using Verizon as the base category. The results are
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TABLE 6 Multinomial Estimates of Switching to Entrants
Choice = AT&T Choice = MCI
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Variable (Standard Error) Effecta (Standard Error) Effecta
INTERNET −0.0752 −0.0054 −0.3828 −0.0061
(0.1340) (0.2337)
CELLULAR 0.0939 0.0075 −0.0094 −0.0003
(0.1282) (0.2175)
NYCITY −0.7183∗∗ −0.0488 −0.0546 0.0000
(0.2958) (0.4627)
HHSIZE 0.2563∗∗∗ 0.0200 0.1834∗ 0.0027
(0.0611) (0.1064)
NYCITY × 0.0399 0.0034 −0.1694 −0.0029
HHSIZE (0.1188) (0.2163)
INCOME −0.0972∗∗∗ −0.0076 −0.0570∗ −0.0008
(0.0205) (0.0339)
AGE (15–34) 0.1934 0.0157 0.3036 0.0053
(0.2248) (0.3400)
AGE (35–54) 0.0039 0.0004 −0.0897 −0.0015
(0.1356) (0.2219)
MOVED1Y 0.1122 0.0094 −0.0969 −0.0017
(0.3156) (0.5539)
BLACK 0.5090∗∗ 0.0483 −0.0982 −0.0024
(0.2274) (0.3970)
HISPANIC −0.6294∗∗ −0.0393 −0.4645 −0.0058
(0.2923) (0.5081)
RACEO −0.3597 −0.0271 1.1756∗∗∗ 0.0348
(0.3304) (0.4436)
ATTLD 3.0470∗∗∗ 0.3526 −0.3956 −0.0118
(0.1507) (0.4333)
MCILD 0.0596 −0.0341 4.3002∗∗∗ 0.4224
(0.4139) (0.2469)
(1 - SAMLD) × −1.3762∗∗∗ −0.0742 −1.7875∗∗∗ −0.0173
SAMBILL (0.2148) (0.3528)
N 3164
Log-likelihood −1350.35
p-value 0.0000
Likelihood ratio index 0.4055
The analysis is based on those households that live in an area where all three carriers offered service at the time of
the household’s bill. Monthly dummies and a dummy for September and October 2001 are included in the estimation.
Dummy variables are included to control for missing data for the MOVED1Y, SAMLD, and SAMBILL variables.
aFor discrete variables, marginal effects refer to a discrete change from 0 to 1.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
in Table 6. Relative to the low predictive power of the probit models, household characteristics
explain a significant fraction of the variance in choice behavior, with a likelihood ratio index of
0.41. Several characteristics, such as income, household size, and race, are statistically but not
practically significant in explaining a household’s decision to choose an entrant. Most significant,
both statistically and economically, is whether the household has prior experience with the provider
through a subscription to its long-distance service and whether the household receives a common
bill for its local and long-distance service but uses two different providers. Households with
AT&T as their long-distance provider are 35.3 percentage points more likely to choose AT&T as
their local provider, whereas the equivalent figure is 42.2 percentage points for MCI. The results
are consistent with a number of interpretations including the entrants marketing their local service
more aggressively to preexisting long-distance customers, consumer benefits from receiving a
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single bill, and perceived quality differences that induce household sorting into providers. The
last possibility suggests possible strategic benefits from bundling the two services. Households
that receive a single bill but utilize different service providers are less likely to switch to an
entrant, reflecting the fact that they incur charges from the entrants for this convenience while
Verizon, due to regulation, offers this service at no additional charge.
Taken all together, these results are consistent with households that already use one of the
entrants as their long-distance provider attributing a higher perceived quality to that firm than
other households. Because the evidence points toward differences in firm quality as contributing
to suboptimal provider choices across households, we allow for firm differentiation effects in
our econometric model. We ignore inertia and demand uncertainty as being of second-order
importance only.
5. Demand model
 In estimating local telecommunications demand, the literature accommodates the presence
of nonlinear tariffs in several ways. Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) employ a nested logit
structure to estimate demand for local phone service in which each nest is a combination of a plan
and a portfolio of calls (number and distance). The immense number of possible portfolios limits
the applicability of the technique. Miravete (2002b) instead infers the distribution of consumers’
utility for local phone calls by incorporating the time lag between the initial plan choice and the
subsequent usage decision. He identifies differences in the distribution of consumer types before
and after a change in plan offerings and analyzes the extent of usage-based discrimination by the
local phone company.
A second strand of the literature models local telecommunications demand as a mixed
discrete/continuous model, building upon earlier empirical work by Dubin and McFadden (1984),
Dubin (1985), Chiang (1991), and Chiang and Lee (1992). One example is the study of local
phone service penetration by Hausman, Tardiff, and Belinfante (1993). Due to lack of usage
data, they estimate only the discrete portion of the model, but incorporate in it the usage choice
consistent with utility maximization. Narayanan, Chintagunta, and Miravete (2007) use a model
similar to ours to study the extent of consumer learning about usage after a new plan introduction.
In contrast to their setting, the types of available calling plans remain virtually unchanged both
prior to and during our sample period and any consumer learning is therefore likely to have
occurred already. Instead, we focus on the effect of competition on consumers’ plan and usage
choices and on modelling bundling of local and regional calling as potential sources of welfare
gains for consumers.
 Household choice problem. In this section, we derive the optimal calling plan and
consumption choices for local, L, and regional, R, service. We consider households indexed
by i = 1, 2, . . . , Im in m = 1, 2, . . . , M markets. The households choose a plan from the set
of available plans, indexed by j = 1, 2, . . . , Jm, offered by firms f = 1, 2, . . . , Fm, and the
quantity of local calls qLij and regional calls q
R
ij they consume on the plan. To consume on plan
j, consumers must pay a fixed fee, Pjm, a per-call local price of pLjm, and a per-call regional
price of pRjm. Consumers spend the remainder of their income on an outside good q
O. Because
approximately 95% of New York households subscribe to landline telephone service and less than
3% of cellular subscribers had fully displaced their landline by March 2002, we do not incorporate
the outside option of not subscribing to telephone service. Lack of data on cellular usage beyond
ownership also forces us to abstract from possible substitution between cellular and landline
usage.
Households have a choice of up to three types of plans per carrier: metered, flat-rate, and
hybrid. On a metered plan, households pay pjm > 0 per call regardless of total usage and pay a
fixed fee of Pjm ≥ 0. On a flat-rate plan, consumers pay nothing for usage ( pjm = 0) but incur a
fixed fee of Pjm > 0. On hybrid plans, households pay a fixed fee Pjm > 0 and pay nothing ( pjm =
0) for usage below a threshold q˜ jm but pay p˜ jm > 0 for usage above q˜ jm . Due to the fixed fee and
C© RAND 2008.
714 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
the bundling of local and regional services, it is optimal for the household to consume on a single
plan j. We assume that household i chooses that plan j that maximizes its utility
u
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i , q
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i j
) = qOi + 1bL
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aLi q
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i > 0; q
L
i j ≤ aLi , qRi j ≤ aRi ,
(1)
subject to the budget constraint
yi ≥ qOi + Pjm + pRjmq Ri j + pLjmqLi j
(
1 − I Hjm
)+ p˜Ljm max (qLi j − q˜ Ljm, 0) I Hjm . (2)
In equation (1), the first term represents the utility obtained from the outside good whose price
we normalize to one. The second and third components measure the utility obtained from local
and regional usage, respectively, as a function of the demand parameters aTi and b
T
i , T = {L , R}.
ζ i f is household i’s perceived quality of firm f and  i is a J × 1 vector of unobservable plan
preferences, which we assume to be distributed according to a type-1 extreme-value distribution.
The budget constraint incorporates the within-plan nonlinear pricing of hybrid plans (I Hjm = 1)
via the call allowance, q˜ Ljm . Conditional on the choice of plan j, the demand for usage of type T
equals
qTi j
(
pTjm
) = {aTi − bT pTjm if pTjm < aTibT
0 otherwise.
(3)
If a household chooses a flat-rate plan or a hybrid plan where it remains within the call allowance,
the demand function simplifies to
qTi j
(
pTjm = 0
) = aTi . (4)
We set the household’s local usage on hybrid plans equal to the allowance q˜ Ljm if the household’s
optimal quantity based on equation (3) at p˜Ljm falls short of the allowance, but the optimal quantity
based on a zero per-call price (equation (4)) exceeds the allowance.
Substituting these conditional demand functions into the household’s utility function yields
a set of conditional indirect utility functions that vary with the household’s choice of plan and
usage patterns. For a household with positive usage of local and regional service, the conditional
indirect utility function is given by
vi j
(
Pjm, pLjm, p˜
L
jm, q˜
L
jm, p
R
jm, yi
)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
yi − Pjm −
(
aRi − 12bR pRjm
)
pRjm−
(
aLi − 12bL pLjm
)
pLjm + ζi f + i j
if q˜ jm = 0 or aLi − bL p˜Ljm ≤ q˜ jm
yi − Pjm −
(
aRi − 12bR pRjm
)
pRjm−
(
aLi − 12bL p˜Ljm − q˜ jm
)
p˜Ljm + ζi f + i j
if 0 < q˜ jm < aLi − bL p˜Ljm .
(5)
The top line displays the indirect utility if the household chooses a flat-rate or metered plan
or a hybrid plan but consumes less than the allowance. The bottom line applies to households
on hybrid plans that consume in excess of the allowance. Corner solutions arise in the data
for regional calls. As shown in Table 2, 65.5% of households make no regional calls, whereas
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all households have some local usage. With zero regional calls, the indirect utility function
equals
vi j
(
Pjm, p
L
jm, p˜
L
jm, q˜
L
jm, p
R
jm, yi
) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
yi − Pjm−
(
aLi − 12bL pLjm
)
pLjm + ζi f + i j
if q˜ jm = 0 or aLi − bL p˜Ljm ≤ q˜ jm
yi − Pjm−
(
aLi − 12bL p˜Ljm − q˜ jm
)
p˜Ljm + ζi f + i j
if 0 < q˜ jm < aLi − bL p˜Ljm .
(6)
We allow the demand intercepts, aT , to vary as a function of the household’s observable and
unobservable characteristics. For the demand functions to be well defined, we restrict aTi to be
positive by specifying it as an exponential function of the household’s characteristics
ln
(
aTi
) = αT + αTD Di + νTi , (7)
where αT and αTD are parameters and Di is a column-vector of characteristics for household i. We
assume that household i’s demand intercept contains an unobservable household taste for local
or regional usage, νTi . The vector ν i captures unobserved household characteristics that affect
demand for local and regional calls, such as the size of the household’s network of contacts in
the area. We assume that the unobserved characteristics ν i = [νLi , νRi ]′ are identically distributed
according to a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix
ν =
[
σ 2L ρσLσR
ρσLσR σ
2
R
]
. (8)
Equation (7) implies that the demand error, νTi , equals
νTi = ln
(
aTi
)− αT − αTD Di
= ln (qTi j + bT p jm)− αT − αTD Di . (9)
Last, we decompose household i’s perceived quality of firm f into observable firm characteristics
and an unobservable firm-level characteristic by parameterizing ζ i f as
ζi f = λ′f Zi + ξ f m, (10)
with λ f denoting a z × 1 vector of parameters. Demographic shifters, Z i , control for differences
in horizontal preferences for a provider among households, for example based on the household’s
experience with the provider for a different type of service. ξ fm represents an unobserved
contribution to firm quality, such as the quality of the provider’s customer service. This
characteristic varies at the level of the firm/market, but not at the level of the plan. It is the
same for all households in the market, representing a vertical attribute of the provider.
The unobservable components in aTi affect the quantity consumed, but the discrete choice
only indirectly through the quantity choice. They vary by household, but not by plan, through νTi .
The unobservable components ξ fm and  i j , on the other hand, affect only the discrete choice and
not the quantity choice.
Similar to the discrete choice demand literature (Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes,
1995, 2004; Goolsbee and Petrin, 2004; Nevo, 2001), the firm-level unobservable, ξ fm, captures
unobserved quality differences between firms within a market. The descriptive results presented
above suggest that unobserved provider characteristics are important in driving household provider
choices, which the prices charged by each provider might reflect. We model the unobservable as
varying at the level of the firm only, instead of the level of the product, because calling plans are
nonlinear pricing schemes that give the customer access to the same customer and billing services
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and quality of calls. This allows us to control for price endogeneity by including provider/market
fixed effects in the household’s indirect utility function.9
Because add-on features represent a significant portion of savings from price effects, it is
important that we accommodate them in the econometric model. There are too many possible
combinations of add-on features offered to estimate their choice by households explicitly. Instead,
we assume that each household consumes an identical bundle of add-on features regardless of
which carrier or plan it chooses. We adjust its budget constraint by the price for that bundle.
Our modelling framework corresponds to that in Hanemann (1984) for the case of mutual
exclusivity whereby each consumer chooses to consume a continuous quantity from a single
provider. Our work thus complements a number of recent papers that consider scenarios in which
households choose an optimal number of discrete products (Chan, 2006; Dube´, 2004; Hendel,
1999) or multiple discrete products (Kim, Allenby, and Rossi, 2002). Whereas the quadratic
utility function and the demand system imply a simple linear relationship between price and
usage regardless of the price level, the utility function easily accommodates the following main
features of the institutional setting. First, the specification allows for bundling of local and regional
usage, but the consumption of one type of call does not affect the marginal utility obtained from
the other. This ensures that the demands for local and regional calls are independent of each other.
Second, marginal utility of calls declines with usage. This allows for satiation of demand on
flat-rate plans with a zero marginal price because, at some point, the household spends so much
time on the phone that it crowds out time spent on outside activities. Third, the utility function
allows for the possibility of zero consumption (a corner solution) for both services.
 Estimation procedure. The predictions from the model consist of an optimal plan choice
and a corresponding usage choice for both local and regional service, as a function of the
household’s observable and unobservable characteristics, the firm’s observable and unobservable
attributes, and the plan’s unobservable attributes. We use maximum likelihood methods to
estimate the model. The full likelihood is the product of the likelihoods for each household
across all markets
L(|d, qˆ L, qˆ R, X ) =
M∏
m=1
Im∏
i=1
lim
(

∣∣dim, qˆ Li jm, qˆ Ri jm, Xim), (11)
where the model’s parameters are collapsed into the vector  andX contains the I m × M vectors of
household characteristics,D, the J m × M vectors of the plans’ pricing components, P, p, p˜, and q˜ ,
and the Fm × I m × M vector of firm/household characteristics,Z. d is the vector of the household’s
observed plan choices across plans in its market, and qˆ L and qˆ R denote its observed usage.
The log-likelihood function for the household is the log of the joint probability of the
household’s plan choice, d i , and its quantity choices, qˆ Li j and qˆ
R
i j . We assume independence
between the choice and usage shocks. The choice shock takes the role of unobserved preferences
for a specific plan due to, for example, exposure to plan-specific advertising. Correlation between
the choice and usage shocks could arise if the provider ran user- and plan-specific advertising
campaigns and decided to promote certain plans specifically to households with a particular usage
profile. We do not believe such correlations to be very significant in our application. Therefore,
the joint probability is the product of the probability that household i chooses plan j conditional
on qˆi j and the probability density of qˆi j . Household i’s contribution to the log-likelihood equals
ln
[
li
(

∣∣di , qˆ Li j , qˆ Ri j , Xi)] = J∑
j=1
Idi j ln
{
f (di j |qˆi j , Xi ; )g(qˆi j |Xi ; )
}
, (12)
9 Price endogeneity is potentially not severe because NYPSC regulates the incumbents’s and, to a lesser extent,
entrants’ prices. We abstract from any remaining unobservable quality differences across plans offered by the same
provider.
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suppressing market subscripts for ease of readability. Idij is an indicator variable set to one if
household i chooses plan j and zero otherwise. f (di j |qˆi j , Xi ; ) denotes the conditional likelihood
of observing household i choosing plan j, while g(qˆi j |Xi ; ) denotes the likelihood of observing
the usage of qˆi j for local and regional service. For households that consume zero regional calls,
equation (9) implies a value for the regional unobservable, νˆRi , that is, the cutoff value for ν where
usage is zero.
For any candidate values of the vector of parameters, , the probability that household i
chooses plan j equals the integral over the distribution function of the choice shock
f (di j |qˆi j , Xi ; ) =
∫
Ci j
dF(i |νi (qˆi j )), (13)
denoting as Ci j = {(νi , Xi , i1, . . . , i J )|vi j ≥ vik, qˆi j ∈ Si jk(νi , Xi , i ; ) ∀k 	= j} the set of
individual preferences that lead to choice j. Sijk is the set of feasible quantity choices for household
i that are consistent with the household choosing plan j over plan k. Ensuring that the observed
quantity choices for local and regional usage fall within the feasible set places restrictions on
the usage shock (ν i ) and unobserved plan preferences ( i ). Thus, we impose two conditions on
the individual preferences that lead to the choice of plan j by household i: plan j must maximize
indirect utility and observed usage must be consistent with plan j being optimal.
To derive the set Sijk , we solve for quantity cutoffs for local and regional usage such that
the conditional indirect utility on plan j exceeds that on plan k. These cutoffs are a function of
the realized usage unobservable for the other service (i.e., ν(qˆ Li j ) for regional usage and ν(qˆ
R
i j ) for
local usage), the difference in the unobserved plan preferences for plans j and k, ( i j −  ik), the
quality differences between the plans’ providers, the prices of plans j and k, and the parameters.
Depending on the relative per-call prices of the two plans, the quantity cutoff provides a minimum
or maximum bound on observed quantity such that the indirect utility on plan j equals that on
plan k.
Using the constraint that the observed local quantity is consistent with the chosen plan, we
can solve for the feasible range of individual preferences, , that entail household i choosing plan
j over plan k and consuming its observed local usage10
i j − ik ≥ qˆ Li j
(
pLj − pLk
)+ (PLj − PLk )− ζi − bL2 [(pLj )2 − (pLk )2]
− b
R
2
[(
pRj
)2 − (pRk )2]+ exp [αR + αRDDi + ν(qˆ Ri j )](pRj − pRk )
+ bL pLj
(
pLj − pLk
) ≡ m¯Li jk(ν(qˆ Ri j ), Xi ; ),
(14)
where ζ i denotes the quality difference between the providers of plan j and plan k. The constraint
on the observed regional usage leads to a corresponding expression m¯Ri jk(ν(qˆ
L
i j ), Xi ; ) that can
be formed by swapping L and R in the above expression. Appendix A provides the detailed
derivation of equation (14). Because the constraint on  i must be met for both local and regional
calls, i j − ik ≥ max(m¯Li jk, m¯Ri jk).
The regions of  i defined by equation (14) and the analogous expression for regional calls
across all k 	= j define Cij . The fact that the unobserved plan preferences are distributed type-1
extreme value implies that the difference between any two  j and  k follows a truncated logistic
distribution with a truncation point of max(m¯Li jk, m¯
R
i jk). We apply a result from Maddala (1983)
to derive an analytical expression for the integral in equation (13). Our assumption that ν i and  i
are independent simplifies this computation of choice probabilities greatly. The probability that
household i chooses plan j, conditional on the realization of the usage unobservable, is
f (di j |qˆi j , Xi ; ) = 1∑J
k=1 exp
[
max
(
m¯Li jk
(
ν
(
qˆ Ri j
)
, Xi ; 
)
, m¯Ri jk
(
ν
(
qˆ Li j
)
, Xi ; 
))] . (15)
10 Equation (14) abstracts from hybrid plans. We discuss the equivalent expressions in Appendix A.
C© RAND 2008.
718 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
We now derive the contribution to the likelihood of the households’ usage decisions,
g(qˆi j |Xi ; ), for the subset of households for whom we observe usage. In computing g(qˆi j |Xi ; ),
we account for the fact that our data only provide truncated information on household usage.
In particular, we do not observe the local usage of households that choose a flat-rate plan or a
hybrid plan if their consumption remains within the plan’s allowance. Under optimality, we can
identify a quantity range into which the household’s local usage has to fall for the chosen plan to
maximize indirect utility. We then map the identified quantity ranges to corresponding ranges of
the usage unobservable νL and compute the probability mass over the identified ranges for those
plans for which we do not observe usage. We adjust the normal density of ν i by this truncation
mass in computing the likelihood g(qˆi j |Xi ; ).
To do this, we first determine the optimal plan over the entire support of νL . We partition
the νL support into S segments such that plan s is optimal over segment s with end points ν¯si and
ν¯s+1i , conditional on unobservable plan-specific preferences and the household’s optimal regional
usage on plan s. The number of segments does not necessarily equal the number of plans in the
household’s choice set, J , because some plans do not maximize utility for any νLi . We eliminate
these dominated plans from the choice set. We next identify the plan that provides the highest
indirect utility at ν¯1i = −∞ and index this plan by s = 1. We then compute the νLi for which
household i is indifferent between plan s and each of the plans remaining in the choice set. The
upper cutoff to the range over which plan s is optimal, ν¯s+1i , is the smallest of these indifference
points. We similarly assign all remaining plans in the choice set to a segment of νLi .
We then compute the probability mass corresponding to those segments among S for which
our data do not contain usage observations. If plan s is a flat-rate plan, we do not observe usage
for any νLi in segment s. If plan s is a hybrid plan, we do not observe usage for the portion of
segment s that entails usage below the allowance. We denote by ULi the probability of ν
L
i falling
into any of the segments without usage data
ULi =
∫
Ci j
∑
s∈S
(
I Fs + I Hs
) (

(
I Fs ν¯
s+1
i + I Hs ν˜s+1i
σL
)
− 
(
ν¯si
σL
))
dF(i |νi (qˆi j )), (16)
where I Fs and I
H
s are flat-rate and hybrid plan indicators. ν˜
s+1
i is the minimum of ν¯
s+1
i and the ν
L
i
value where usage equals q˜s . Because the comparison of indirect utilities across plans depends
on the differences in  i , we integrate over the distribution of the unobservable plan preferences
using simulation techniques to approximate ULi numerically. Figure 3 illustrates the procedure for
a household that chooses among a metered plan, a hybrid plan, and a flat-rate plan. Appendix B
provides the detailed steps behind the estimation algorithm.
The contribution of the household’s usage to the likelihood is
g(qˆi j |Xi ; ) =
(
1
1 − ULi
) Ji
(2π )
1
2 |ν| 12
exp
{−νi (qˆi j )′−1ν νi (qˆi j )
2
}
(17)
if qˆ Ri j > 0, and
g(qˆi j |Xi ; ) =
(
1
1 − ULi
) (
1 − (νRi (qˆ Ri j = 0))) Ji
(2π )
1
2 σL
exp
{
−(νLi (qˆ Li j))2
2σ 2L
}
(18)
if qˆ Ri j = 0. Here,  denotes the normal distribution function of νR conditional on νL and Ji is the
Jacobian of the transformation from ν i to qij .
When we do not observe the household’s local usage, we compute the household’s plan-
choice probability in equation (15) by substituting the regional usage error ν(qˆ Ri j ) and integrating
over the unobservable νLi to obtain the household’s contribution to the log-likelihood:
ln
[
li
(

∣∣di , qLi j , qˆ Ri j , Xi)] = J∑
j=1
Idi j ln
{∫ ∞
−∞
f
(
di j
∣∣qLi j(νLi ), qˆ Ri j , Xi ; )dFνLi } . (19)
We again use simulation techniques to approximate the integral in the likelihood.
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FIGURE 3
ILLUSTRATION OF COMPUTATION OF TRUNCATION MASS
 Identification. Both the discrete and the continuous choice equations identify parameters
in our model. The parameters of the demand function, a and b, are identified by variation in
the observed usage and prices across space and time for households that have chosen a metered
plan or consume above the allowance on a hybrid plan. The coefficients on Di are identified by
systematic variation in usage for households with different characteristics, whereas the covariance
parameters in ν are pinned down by remaining unexplained variance in usage quantities. These
allow us to measure how well the observable characteristics explain households’ plan choices
and consumption. The parameter b is identified by households with similar characteristics facing
different per-call prices because they live in different places, consume on different plans, or
consume at different times.
Variation in household and firm characteristics identify the parameters in the perceived firm
quality index. The λ parameters are identified by variation in characteristics of each provider’s
customers, relative to the base category, Verizon households. These different household/firm
characteristics lead to different choices of firms’ plans by households even at equivalent prices
across the firms. The vector of ξ parameters measures the common component of households’
preferences in a particular firm/market and is identified by observing multiple households in the
same market choosing the same firm.
 Results. In estimation, we allow demand to shift as a function of the household’s size,
income, age category, and other communications services (cellular and Internet service) used by
the household. We also include as a characteristic the plan’s coverage area as a measure of the
potential population a household can call given its location, as suggested by Taylor and Kridel
(1990) and Bodnar, Dilworth, and Iacono (1988). The chosen utility function does not include
income effects for either type of call, which are likely small given the average monthly bill is only
0.74% of the lowest income category. Instead, income is included as a proxy for intensity of use
or the opportunity cost of time spent talking on the phone. Finally, we include a fourth-quarter
dummy to allow for the possibility of increased usage during holiday periods.
C© RAND 2008.
720 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
To capture differences in households’ horizontal preferences for each carrier, we include
the household’s choice of one of the entrants’ long-distance services, whether the household has
recently moved to New York State, and the household’s monthly income. To limit the number of
parameters, we assume that customer service and other unobserved quality measures are constant
within the metro and non-metro areas and estimate provider-specific fixed effects for these areas.
We allow quality differences to vary by market structure by estimating separate fixed effects
for the period prior to AT&T’s entry in November 1999, for the period of its limited rollout of
service until August 2001, and for the remaining sample period after its entry into all of Verizon’s
territory. We normalize firm quality by setting the perceived quality of Verizon to zero.
Table 7 contains model estimates. Both local and regional usage are greater if the household
owns a cellular phone. This suggests that cellular service proxies for intensity of household
communication needs. Internet service is associated with significantly greater demand for
local usage, consistent with most households accessing the Internet via phone lines during this
time period. Usage of both services is also increasing in household size. The youngest cohort
consumes the most of local service, but the least of regional service. Similarly, the middle age
bracket has higher local, but lower regional, usage than the oldest cohort does. Higher-income
households consume fewer local calls, but more regional calls than lower-income households do.
Households make fewer regional calls, but not statistically different use of local calling, during
the holiday period. Finally, the coverage area of a calling plan has the expected positive effect
on regional usage, but a negative effect on local usage. This reflects perhaps other confounding
factors such as a higher demand for local phone usage in rural areas with smaller coverage areas.
The results for the households’ discrete choice differ from the earlier multinomial logit
results, reflecting the effect of the usage decision on the plan choice captured by the full model.
The quality dummies for AT&T and MCI are negative, consistent with Verizon’s greater market
share. Unobserved AT&T quality is greater in non-metro than metro regions, whereas unobserved
MCI quality is greater in the later relative to the earlier period. Households that moved within
the previous year are more likely to switch to AT&T or MCI, whereas higher-income households
are less likely to do so. Finally, households that have AT&T as their long-distance provider are
most likely to use AT&T for local service and least likely to subscribe to Verizon. Households
that have MCI for their long-distance service are most likely to use MCI for their local service,
but then prefer Verizon to AT&T, although the latter difference is not significant.
We recognize the nonlinear nature of the pricing plans in calculations of elasticities by
estimating both a usage and a choice elasticity. We compute usage elasticities for both local and
regional usage. Relative to previous studies of U.S. telecommunications services (for example,
Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva, 1987; Danaher, 2002), we find a slightly more elastic industry
demand for local usage (−2.08), whereas demand for regional usage is less elastic (−1.15)
than it is for local. Our model allows us to estimate choice elasticities with respect to prices
in a way that fully reflects the discrete/continuous nature of the consumers’ choices. This is
critical in computing elasticities in markets characterized by competition in menus of nonlinear
pricing plans. For metered plans, we calculate the percentage response in market share to a
percentage change in the fixed fee and local per-call price for each carrier.11 For both prices,
AT&T’s residual demand is most elastic. Elasticities for Verizon’s metered plans are least elastic
for both the per-call price and the fixed fee. This results from the fact that many households
(those located in New York City) do not have a Verizon flat-rate plan available as a choice, and
if they have a strong preference for Verizon, have relatively inelastic demand for the one Verizon
product available to them. Similar to the metered plan elasticities, we find an inelastic demand
for Verizon’s flat-rate plan in response to changes in the fixed fee.
 Consumer welfare gains from entry. Our model allows us to perform various counter-
factuals based on the estimated parameters. To assess the welfare implications of restricting the
11 We weigh the choice responses by households’ predicted choice probabilities.
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TABLE 7 Parameter Estimates and Elasticities
Local Usage Regional Usage
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Demand intercept (aT )
CONSTANT (αT ) 4.9146∗∗∗ 0.0266 1.3623∗∗∗ 0.0866
INCOME (αTD,1) −0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0027 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0071
INTERNET (αTD,2) 0.1600
∗∗∗ 0.0185 −0.1064∗∗ 0.0504
CELLULAR (αTD,3) 0.0265
∗∗ 0.0147 0.3031∗∗∗ 0.0499
HHSIZE (αTD,4) 0.1203
∗∗∗ 0.0098 0.1504∗∗∗ 0.0232
AGE (15–34) (αTD,5) 0.1604
∗∗∗ 0.0250 −0.6090∗∗∗ 0.0950
AGE (35–54) (αTD,6) 0.0704
∗∗∗ 0.0146 −0.4540∗∗∗ 0.0576
4th QUARTER (αTD,7) 0.0042 0.0141 −0.2462∗∗∗ 0.0544
COVERAGE (αTD,8) −0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.3494∗∗∗ 0.0714
Demand slope (bT ) 506.8994∗∗∗ 16.0700 9.7873∗∗∗ 0.7019
Standard deviation of νT (σ T ) 0.4725∗∗∗ 0.0167 1.2081∗∗∗ 0.0312
Correlation, νL and νR −0.2213∗∗∗ 0.0655
Average usage price elasticity −2.08 −1.15
Discrete Choice
Coefficient Standard Error
Choice = AT&T
MOVED1Y (λ11) 1.2183∗∗∗ 0.2996
INCOME (λ12) −0.2154∗∗∗ 0.0238
ATTLD (λ13) 9.3138∗∗∗ 0.2837
MCILD (λ14) −0.0849 0.3121
ξ ATT(1stWAVE/METRO) −11.3126∗∗∗ 0.3083
ξ ATT(1stWAVE/NON−METRO) −0.3235 0.2777
ξ ATT(2ndWAVE/METRO) −8.5298∗∗∗ 0.3072
ξ ATT(2ndWAVE/NON−METRO) −4.3078∗∗∗ 0.2654
Choice = MCI
MOVED1Y (λ21) 0.5976∗ 0.4199
INCOME (λ22) −0.1358∗∗∗ 0.0217
ATTLD (λ23) 1.0200∗∗∗ 0.4048
MCILD (λ24) 5.2297∗∗∗ 0.3691
ξ MCI(PRE/1stWAVE/METRO) −5.6816∗∗∗ 0.3218
ξ MCI(PRE/1stWAVE/NON−METRO) −8.9514∗∗∗ 0.4038
ξ MCI(2ndWAVE/METRO) −4.5449∗∗∗ 0.3469
ξ MCI(2ndWAVE/NON−METRO) −3.9957∗∗∗ 0.3842
Choice elasticity with respect to AT&T MCI Verizon
Local usage price, metered plans −1.8168 −1.6263 −0.7088
Fixed-fee, metered plans −2.5730 −2.2339 −0.6254
Fixed-fee, flat-rate plans −4.2365 −4.9007 −1.9151
Log-likelihood −34,378.80
The number of observations are 4791 for the discrete choice, 2876 for local usage, and 4672 for regional usage.
Dummy variables are included to control for missing data for the CELLULAR and MOVED1Y variables. Choice
elasticity weights households by likelihood of choosing carrier’s plan.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
available carriers to Verizon only, we compute the expected consumer surplus that households
achieve by choosing the optimal contemporaneous plan available from Verizon and compare it
to the expected consumer surplus obtained from choosing the optimal plan under the full range
of choices.12 Estimates of the consumer welfare gains from entry under this counterfactual are
12 We compute the expected consumer surplus using the “log-sum” formula derived in Small and Rosen (1981).
We simulate over the usage unobservables holding each household’s set of simulation draws fixed (if we do not observe
usage) or fixed at the realized unobserved unobservable (if we observe usage) across all counterfactual analyses.
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TABLE 8 Monthly Consumer Welfare Gains in Monetary Equivalent Terms ($): Counterfactual Analyses
Average Welfare Gain in $ and as % of Average Billa
(Standard deviation of welfare gain in $)
All Households AT&T Households MCI Households
Overall gains from entry 0.828 2.50% 2.774 7.09% 1.129 3.66%
(3.415) (4.578) (1.924)
Bundled local and regional planb 0.211 0.64% 0.661 1.69%
(1.887) (2.667)
New York City flat-rate plansc 0.681 2.05% 2.215 5.66% 0.807 2.61%
(3.989) (6.267) (1.771)
Service differentiation 0.256 0.77% 1.837 4.69% 0.643 2.08%
(1.092) (2.246) (2.105)
aPercent welfare gain measured as fraction of average monthly bill in the sample ($33.16 for all households, $39.14
for AT&T households, and $30.87 for MCI households). The “All Households” category includes households on AT&T,
MCI, and Verizon.
bOnly applicable to AT&T households.
cFor households located in New York City.
displayed in the first row of Table 8. In terms of the compensating variation, we find that across all
households, the entry of AT&T and MCI results in monetary savings of approximately $0.83 or
2.5% of households’ average monthly bill. The welfare gains across households vary significantly,
however, with a standard deviation of $3.42 in monetary savings. The large standard deviation
results from most households achieving moderate benefits but a few realizing large benefits. We
also split up welfare gains by entrant. AT&T households gain more than MCI households do,
with gains of $2.77 and $1.13 per household, respectively.
In addition to having additional choices of carriers, households also experience new pricing
plan types offered by the entrants. Two important cases of plan introductions are the bundled local
and regional service plan offered by AT&T throughout its coverage area and the flat-rate plans
introduced by AT&T and MCI in New York City. Verizon, in contrast, does not introduce new plans
in response to competition during the sample period. To quantify the benefits of these new plan
types, we remove these plans from the households’ choice sets and compare the expected consumer
surplus obtained under this restricted set of options to the baseline. The difference estimates the
monetary equivalent of the welfare gain from the introduction of these plans. Row 2 of Table 8
provides the estimates of the effects of the introduction of AT&T’s bundled plan. The average sav-
ings from the plan introduction across all households is $0.21 with a standard deviation of $1.89.
Welfare gains from the other major new plan type, flat-rate plans in New York City, are listed in the
third row of Table 8. Gains from these plans, $0.68 on average across New York City households,
are greater per-capita than from the bundled local and regional calling plan but accrue to only
17.7% of sample households. If averaged across all households, the benefits of the New York City
flat-rate plans are $0.12. Both plan introductions thus yield substantial contributions to the overall
welfare gain, highlighting the importance of increased plan variety as a result of entry. AT&T’s
and MCI’s plan introductions alter the nature of price discrimination in these markets by using
new nonlinear pricing or bundling strategies, which we find to be consumer welfare enhancing.
Our earlier descriptive results pointed to consumers regarding the providers’ offerings as
differentiated. We estimate the gains from this differentiation by allowing households to choose
among the full range of plans, but eliminating any horizontal or vertical quality differences
between firms. We do this by equating the ζ ’s for the entrants to that of the incumbent (i.e., we
set ζ i f = 0 for all plans). Utility differences relative to the baseline expected consumer surplus
quantify the differentiation effects from entry. The counterfactual as well as the estimation
assumes that Verizon’s service quality is constant during the sample period because we have no
direct or anecdotal evidence that Verizon significantly improved customer service or increased
advertising after entry. The last row of Table 8 summarizes estimates of these effects. We find
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TABLE 9 Stratified: Average Monthly Welfare Gain in $ and as % of Bill
Low High
Mean % of Mean % of
(Standard deviation) Bill N (Standard deviation) Bill N t-statistica
Local usageb 0.293 2.25% 2419 1.354 6.18% 2436 −10.962
(1.543) (4.503)
Use of vertical featuresc 0.571 3.91% 3021 1.244 4.15% 1834 −6.696
(2.592) (4.413)
Use of communications servicesd 0.741 3.03% 656 1.458 4.00% 1403 −3.560
(2.512) (4.866)
Demand intercept, E[aLi ]
e
New York City hhs 0.986 4.41% 587 4.136 9.74% 260 −7.923
(2.976) (8.540)
Remaining hhs 0.470 2.88% 1843 0.687 3.91% 2165 −2.531
(2.144) (3.102)
Use of carrier across 0.522 2.10% 4136 2.569 10.53% 719 −15.200
servicesf (3.142) (4.276)
aT-test statistic for μlow − μhigh.
bHigh local usage denotes households with above-median usage, including flat-rate households.
cHigh usage of vertical features denotes households with positive vertical features expenditures.
dHigh usage of communications services denotes households that use at least one of cellular service, Internet, pager,
fax, or a personal digital assistant (PDA).
eHigh demand intercept denotes households with an above-median predicted demand intercept.
f High use of carrier across services denotes households that also use their local carrier for long-distance service; low
use denotes households that do not.
that on average households gain $0.26 in monetary savings (0.77% of the average monthly bill)
from firm heterogeneity, with a standard deviation of $1.09. AT&T households benefit most
from differentiation ($1.84 per household on average) relative to MCI households ($0.64 per
household).
We next investigate the extent to which heterogeneity in welfare gains is correlated with
household observables. First, we consider welfare gains as a function of the households’ valuation
of telephone service using several observed proxies for valuation of telephone service. These
include the intensity of usage measured in terms of calls made or the predicted local demand
intercept, the use of vertical features, and the use of additional communication services (Internet,
cellular, or paging services). Table 9 displays summary statistics of welfare gains for high- and
low-valuation households. Across all proxies for valuation, high-valuation households realize
statistically significant higher welfare gains in monetary terms. However, as a percent of their
monthly bill, only usage-intensive households benefit significantly more, both in a statistical and
in an economic sense, from entry. New York City households benefit more than other households
do, using the household’s predicted local demand intercept as a proxy for usage intensity. As a
result, low-usage households in New York City benefit by about the same amount as high-usage
households outside of New York City. In Table 9, we also compare households that benefit from
bundling of local and long-distance services (and therefore single-billing) by the entrants to
the remaining households. In a confirmation of the descriptive results, we find that gains for
households that use an entrant for both services outweigh gains of the remaining households by
a factor of five.
The results in Table 10, which explain the monetary welfare benefits by the household
characteristics in a tobit model, reinforce and extend these findings. The welfare gains increase
by $0.22 and $1.95 for each additional household member for households outside and inside
New York City, respectively. Welfare is higher by $1.20 for black households and decline by
a modest $0.12 for every additional $1000 of monthly income. Because larger, lower-income
households have higher local telecommunications services demand, on average, entry benefits
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TABLE 10 Tobit Estimates of Amount of Welfare Gain
Coefficient Standard Error
INTERNET 0.4218 0.2982
CELLULAR 0.3499 0.2873
NYCITY −1.4622∗∗ 0.7005
HHSIZE 0.2212 0.1398
NYCITY∗HHSIZE 1.7311∗∗∗ 0.2801
INCOME −0.1153∗∗ 0.0454
AGE (15–34) 0.8252 0.5059
AGE (35–54) −0.0326 0.3191
MOVED1Y 0.6709 0.7505
DMOVED −0.1151 0.8138
BLACK 1.2017∗∗ 0.5157
HISPANIC −0.7172 0.7158
RACEO 0.5678 0.7071
ATTLD 3.1055∗∗∗ 0.4402
MCILD 1.2628∗∗ 0.4942
σ 3.7111∗∗∗ 0.0931
N 810
Log-likelihood −2184.01
Likelihood ratio index 0.04
% uncensored observations 0.98
∗Significant at 10%.
∗∗Significant at 5%.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%.
disproportionately high-usage, and thus high-valuation, households. This combined with the
results in Table 9 suggests that entry intensified competition for high-valuation customers. As
in Table 9, the most significant source of gains is the ability to use a single provider for both
services, associated with an increase in welfare gains by $3.11 and $1.26 for AT&T and MCI
households, respectively.
As a last counterfactual analysis, we investigate the benefits generated from discounts
available to qualifying low-income households. AT&T and MCI offered discounts on the monthly
fixed fee for flat-rate plans, while Verizon offered them on flat-rate and metered plans. In our
sample, 13.2% of households pay the discounted rates. Removing the discounted plans from
qualifying households’ choice sets suggests that they benefit by on average $5.18, or 13.2%, from
their availability (averaged over all households, the benefits are $0.69, or 1.75%). These figures
represent an upper bound on consumer benefits, however, as our model precludes the households
from disconnecting their service altogether in response to an elimination of low-income discounts.
We also do not account for the additional waiver of a subscriber line charge for $6.50 that the
households receive, which increases consumer benefits.
We conduct several robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of our results and the
accompanying welfare effects to our modelling assumptions. First, we investigate further the
importance of inertia, switching costs, and consumer learning about the entrants’ services and their
own level of demand. These factors would introduce state-dependence into consumer behavior
that we abstract from in our model. We reestimate the model using data from the second half
of the sample period only (Q1 2002 to Q1 2003), a period when consumer learning is arguably
likely to have already occurred. The estimated coefficients based on this subsample of households
imply average welfare effects of $1.08 per household, which is slightly higher, but similar to that
of the full sample.13 Second, as discussed in Section 3, we lose a number of observations due to
13 Using data after the introduction of metered service, Narayanan, Chintagunta, and Miravete (2007) find modest
welfare effects of consumers resolving uncertainty primarily about average usage, which the households did not observe
previously. In our setting, uncertainty about mean usage is likely significantly smaller.
C© RAND 2008.
ECONOMIDES, SEIM, AND VIARD / 725
data incompleteness and data entry errors. The degree of attrition in the data at the carrier level
is 15% for AT&T, 38% for MCI, and 24% for Verizon. We reestimate the model adjusting the
likelihood for the differential attrition rates at the carrier level. We find the model estimates to be
robust to this alternative likelihood specification.
Because our data are of limited duration, we focus on the medium-term effects of unbundling.
In the long term, unbundling may influence the incentives of incumbents and entrants to invest
in infrastructure. One of the goals of the 1996 Act is to encourage the rapid deployment of
new telecommunications technologies. The literature has debated whether it provides the correct
incentive structure for incumbents and entrants to do so (see Hausman and Sidak, 2005, for a
summary of the issues in question and Crandall, Ingraham, and Singer, 2004, for some empirical
evidence on the effect of lease rates on incumbents’ investment). Avenues for unbundling to
contribute to such deployment include allowing entrants to invest profits earned through access-
based entry in their own infrastructure and inducing incumbents to increase investments in the
more competitive market. At the same time, fear that the new investments would be subject to
unbundling might deter such investment. However, such fears have not been realized thus far
in the United States, where regulators have not ordered any unbundling at cost-based prices
after the 1996 Act and new fiber-to-the-home networks by AT&T and Verizon are essentially
unregulated.
6. Conclusion
 A major goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act was to encourage entry into local phone
service with the objectives of achieving better alignment between prices and costs, increased
service quality, increased variety of service offerings, and efficiency gains in the form of “one-
stop shopping” across different telecommunications services. In this article, we develop a model
to measure the realization of these goals by evaluating consumer welfare gains in each of these
areas. We quantify total welfare effects and estimate the contributions from pure price effects,
horizontal and vertical quality differences across providers, and new pricing plan introductions,
using a random sample of households in New York State.
Our counterfactual analyses suggest that the average household in the sample benefited by
2.5% of the average monthly bill in total from the additional plan and provider choices introduced
by the entrants. Our results show that although households benefit from price reductions due to
AT&T’s and MCI’s entry into local phone service, they benefit more from the entrants’ new plan
types and quality differences from the incumbent’s services. Our work suggests that regulators
take into account more than price effects in considering whether to unbundle networks and
in evaluating the numerous unbundling experiments taking place around the world. This is of
particular relevance for recent years where cellular and Internet phone companies have competed
more effectively with local telephone companies for subscribers. By 2006, an estimated 12.8% of
U.S. households rely solely on cellular phones for communication, while 3.1% use Internet phone
service via Voice over Internet Protocol (Blumberg, Luke, and Cynamon, 2006). The consumer
welfare gains from the increased viability of such services as full substitutes for local phone
service likely exceed our estimated welfare gains substantially, due to both increased product
variety and increased price competition.
Although the United States effectively discontinued unbundling of local service in 2004,
before an evaluation of its longer-term welfare effects became possible, some of the worldwide
examples of unbundling may yield longer time series of data to permit such an evaluation.
Interesting extensions to our current results include evaluating whether consumers choose to
remain with or continue to switch to entrants’ services in the longer term and whether entrants’
service differentiation persists or consumers perceive providers’ services as more homogeneous
over time. Other contexts also raise different regulatory issues related to unbundling. For example,
under the European Union’s 2000 Unbundling Regulations, national regulators may decide to set
lease rates for combined unbundling of voice and data service as well as for limited unbundling
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of data access only. Our econometric model can easily accommodate consumers’ choices to
purchase voice and data service from the same or from different firms to estimate the welfare
effects of alternative pricing scenarios for full unbundling relative to unbundling of data service
only.
Appendix A
 In this appendix, we derive the feasible set for local usage for a household that chooses plan j. The derivation of
constraints on regional usage is analogous. To derive a constraint on local usage for household i that prefers plan j to plan
k, we first find the range of νLi for which plan j is preferred to plan k conditional on the unobserved plan preferences  i j
and  ik and the regional usage unobservable νRi . Household i chooses plan j over plan k when the indirect utility from
plan j exceeds that from plan k (i.e., vij > vik). Using the indirect utility function (equation (5)) conditional on a particular
realization of  i j ,  ik , and νRi , this leads to a cutoff ν¯
L
i jk(ν
R
i , Xi , i ; ) such that
exp[νLi ] <
1
exp
[
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]
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{
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2
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)2
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(
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2
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(A1)
if pLj > p
L
k . If p
L
j < p
L
k , then exp[ν
L
i ] > exp(ν¯
L
i jk(ν
R
i , Xi , i ; )). The cutoff on the local usage unobservable translates
into a constraint on the observed usage of qˆ Li j < q¯
L
i jk ≡ exp[αL + αLDDi + ν¯Li jk(νRi , Xi , i ; )] − bL pLj if pLj > pLk and
qˆ Li j > q¯
L
i jk if p
L
j < p
L
k .
The set of unobserved plan preferences that ensure that this quantity constraint is satisfied results from substituting
ν¯Li jk(ν
R
i , Xi , i ; ) from equation (A1) into the quantity constraint and rearranging
i j − ik > qˆ Li j
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(A2)
which is equation (14) in the article. If plan j is a hybrid plan, we observe usage only for households that exceed the
allowance. In this case, equation (A2) becomes
i j − ik > qˆ Li j
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ζi − p˜Lj q˜ Lj −
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+ exp
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](
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.
(A3)
If the comparison plan k is a hybrid plan, we use as our cutoff on the unobserved preferences the larger of (i) the
cutoff that results from using the indirect utility on plan k for usage above the allowance and (ii) that from using the
indirect utility on plan k for usage below the allowance.
Appendix B
 This appendix contains a detailed outline of the estimation algorithm. The estimation procedure works as follows:
(i) For each household with quantity data, draw a matrix of N 1 (J i − 1) -dimensional errors from a logistic distribution,
where J i is the number of plans available to household i. These represent  i differences between one plan in the
choice set and the remaining (J i − 1) plans, which are sufficient to build the  i difference for any two plans in the
household’s choice set.14 To draw the logistic errors subject to the truncation points described by equations (A2)
and (A3), we follow Train (2002). We set N 1 equal to 30 and hold these draws constant for the remainder of the
algorithm.
(ii) For each household with missing local quantity data, draw a vector of N 2 errors from a bivariate normal distribution,
representing νLi and ν
R
i , which are held constant through all iterations of the estimation routine. We set N 2 equal to
30 and hold these draws constant for the remainder of the algorithm.
14 The relationship between drawing from a logistic distribution and differences in type-1 extreme value errors is
explained in Train (2002).
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(iii) For households with observed local and regional quantity information:
Step 1. Compute the predicted demand shocks at the current parameter estimates:
(a) Back out the household’s realization of νLi and ν
R
i at the observed quantity choices qˆ
L
i j and qˆ
R
i j using equation (9).
(b) Determine the household’s optimal local and regional quantities on each plan based on ν(qˆ Li j ) and ν(qˆ
R
i j ). For
all metered and flat-rate plans, use equations (3) and (4) to compute the optimal quantity. For hybrid plans,
compute the optimal usage on the plan based on equation (3), using p˜ jm . If the optimal quantity is below
the threshold, then compute the optimal quantity based on a zero per-unit price (equation (4)). If the optimal
quantity based on a zero per-unit price is above q˜ j , then set usage to q˜ j .
Step 2. Based on the optimal local and regional quantities, compute the plan-choice probabilities at the current
parameter estimates:
(a) Compute the deterministic part of each plan’s indirect utility using the appropriate indirect utility function
from equations (5) and (6).
(b) Compute f (dij) according to equation (15) conditional on ν(qˆ Li j ) and ν(qˆ
R
i j ).
Step 3. Determine the optimal plan over the entire support of νL . Partition the νL support into S segments such
that plan s is optimal over segment s, conditional on the current set of parameters, unobservable plan-specific
preferences, and the household’s optimal regional usage on plan s (based on ν(qˆ Ri j ) implied by the chosen plan j).
15
We denote the segments’ end points by ν¯1i , ν¯
2
i , . . . , ν¯
S+1
i and compute them as follows:
(a) Truncate each draw of ni to be consistent with equation (14).
(b) Given the truncated ni ’s, eliminate all flat-rate plans except the optimal one based on equations (5) and (6).
Also, eliminate any other plans that are dominated by another single plan or combination of plans.
(c) The initial and final segments in the tails of the distribution are defined over νLi ∈ [ν¯1i , ν¯2i ] and νLi ∈ [ν¯Si , ν¯S+1i ],
where ν¯1i = −∞ and ν¯S+1i = ∞. In practice, we set ν¯1i = −5σ L and ν¯S+1i = 5σ L .
(d) Identify the plan that provides the highest indirect utility at νLi = ν¯1i :
(i) For each plan, compute the optimal quantity and the corresponding indirect utilities from equations (5)
and (6) given ν¯1i .
(ii) Find the plan g that provides the maximum indirect utility, index it by s = 1, and remove it from the
consideration set.
(e) Find ν¯si , s = 2, 3, · · · , S − 1, S:
(i) Compute the νLi for which household i is indifferent between plan g and each of the plans k remaining
in the consideration set. For each pair of plans, g and k, this cutoff equals
ν¯igk = ln
[
1
exp[αL + αLDDi ](pLg − pLk )
{
(Pk − Pg) + ζi
− (ik − ig) − bL2
[(
pLk
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(
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− bR
2
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pRk
)2
−
(
pRg
)2]
+ exp
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αR + αRDDi + νRi
](
pRk − pRg
)}⎤⎦ .
(B1)
If plan g is a hybrid plan, we compute two separate cutoffs, one for pLg = 0 and one for pLg = p˜Lg ,
as discussed in Appendix A. We then verify that the resulting cutoffs ν¯igk(p
L
g = 0, pLk ) and ν¯igk( pLg =
p˜Lg , p
L
k ) entail usage that falls into the usage segment where the respective usage price applies, with
qLig(ν¯igk( p
L
g = 0, pLk )) ≤ q˜ Lg and qLig(ν¯igk( pLg = p˜Lg , pLk )) > q˜ Lg , and retain only those cutoffs that satisfy
their quantity restriction. If both plans g and k are hybrid plans, we allow for the possibility of four
separate cutoffs and verify quantity conditions on both plans, which again results in at most two cutoffs
between the two plans.
(ii) Cutoff ν¯si is the minimum ν¯igk for all k . Denote the associated plan by g and index it by s. If there is at
most one valid cutpoint between plan g and each of the remaining plans greater than ν¯si , remove plan g
from the consideration set as it will not be optimal for any νLi > ν¯
s
i . Repeat the previous step until all
remaining plans in the consideration set have been assigned to a segment of νLi .
Step 4. Compute the probability mass corresponding to those segments among S for which usage data would be
unobserved:
(a) Determine over what portion of each segment, if any, we would not observe the local quantity:
(i) If plan s is a flat-rate plan, we do not observe usage for any νLi ∈ [ν¯si , ν¯s+1i ].
15 Such a partition into consecutive ranges is possible because indirect utility declines monotonically in νLi . As a
result, there is at most one νLi where the indirect utilities on any pair of a flat-rate and a metered plan are equal and at
most two for any pair of a hybrid and a metered plan or pair of two hybrid plans.
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(ii) If plan s is a hybrid plan, we do not observe usage for the portion of νLi ∈ [ν¯si , ν¯s+1i ] that entails usage
below the allowance:
Compute the quantity of local calls at ν¯s+1i at a usage price of zero
qLis
(
ν¯s+1i
)
= exp
(
αL + αLDDi + ν¯s+1i
)
. (B2)
If qLis (ν¯
s+1
i ) > q˜s , then compute the ν
L
i in segment s where household i first exceeds the call allowance
q˜s at the positive usage price p˜Ls as
ν˜s+1i = ln
(
q˜s + bL p˜Ls
)
− αL − αLDDi . (B3)
If qLis (ν¯
s+1
i ) ≤ q˜s , we do not observe usage for any νLi ∈ [ν¯si , ν¯s+1i ] and ν˜s+1i = ν¯s+1i .
(b) Denote by ULni the probability of ν
L
i falling into any of the segments without usage data
ULni =
∑
s∈S
(
I Fs + I Hs
) (

(
I Fs ν¯
s+1
i + I Hs ν˜s+1i
σL
)
− 
(
ν¯si
σL
))
, (B4)
where I Fs is a flat-rate plan indicator and I
H
s a hybrid plan indicator.
Repeat steps 3 and 4 for all N 1 truncated  i draws.
(iv) For households without local quantity information:
Step 1. Determine the household’s optimal quantity on each plan for the νLni draw and the implied ν(qˆ
R
i j ).
Step 2. Based on the optimal quantities, compute the predicted plan-choice probabilities:
(a) Compute the deterministic part of each plan’s indirect utility using the appropriate indirect utility function
from equations (5) and (6).
(b) Compute f (dij) according to equation (15) conditional on the household’s current draw νLni .
Repeat steps 1 and 2 for all N 2 ν draws.
(v) Compute the joint probability of plan and usage choices for each household and each plan: For households with
observed local usage data, this joint probability equals
ln[li ] =
J∑
j=1
Idi j ln
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if qˆ Ri j > 0, or
ln[li ] =
J∑
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Idi j ln
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if qˆ Ri j = 0.  is the cdf of νR conditional on νL (qˆ Li j ).
For households without local usage data, this probability equals their plan choice probability
ln[li ] =
J∑
j=1
Idi j ln
{
1
N2
N2∑
n=1
f
(
di j |ν
(
qˆ Ri j
)
, νLni , Xi ; 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. (B7)
(vi) Update the parameters to maximize the log-likelihood function for the entire sample
lnL (|d, qˆ L , qˆ R, X) = I∑
i=1
ln
[
li
(
|di , qˆ Li j , qˆ Ri j , Xi
)]
. (B8)
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